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Executive Summary 
 
This thesis deals with the application of agenda setting and decision theories to a con-
crete case of European policy making: The case of the European satellite navigation 
system GALILEO. 
Focusing on March 2002, the date when the final decision on the realization of GALI-
LEO was made by the European Council in Barcelona, the thesis elaborates on the geo-
political, economic and financial engineering background of the Council decision. 
While the geopolitical situation since the late 1990s was in favor of GALILEO, 
significant fiscal pressures in important EU member states were preventing the issue to 
gain momentum on the EU agenda. 
With the background of the decision described, the thesis turns to theories of agenda 
setting and decision making that allow for a systematic analysis of the decision situation 
and decision process. The agenda setting part introduces a high and a low politics route 
and stages of issue careers as issue specification, expansion and entrance. The decision 
making part provides theories of bounded rationality, incrementalism, garbage can and a 
policy window approach. 
With these frameworks introduced, the case of GALILEO can be attributed to a high 
politics route and issue career stages can be applied to situations of GALILEO’s way 
through the European decision process. Decision theories enlighten the decision made 
by the Council and as a key turning point emerges the presentation of a new study with 
different fiscal and economic projections concerning GALILEO in end 2001. This study 
allowed to readjust policy makers their previous negative assessment of the economic 
perspectives of the project and to give the “go ahead”. With a different perspective, this 
new study could be interpreted as a seemingly objective justification for political 
leaders to decide in favor of the project, although many doubts about the financial 
feasibility of GALILEO remained. This situation fits well with the theoretical approach 
of Kingdon’s policy window and has characteristics of the garbage can model as well.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“Europe has finally taken the political decision to launch this strategic [satellite naviga-
tion] program. Today we are seeing the creative side of Europe," declared Ms Loyola de 
Palacio, the Commission Vice-president responsible for transport and energy. "This is 
good news and it shows the European Union's capacity to carry out an ambitious indus-
trial project that will create 150, 000 highly qualified jobs and generate income of some 
10 billion EUR a year. It will help Europe to maintain its autonomy, its sovereignty, its 
technological capacity and control of its knowledge," she concluded (Commission of the 
European Union, 2002) This statement followed the sober words of the Barcelona Euro-
pean Council  that only a couple of days before decided to ask the Transport Council 
“…to take the necessary decisions regarding both the funding and launching of [the 
GALILEO] program” (Presidency of the European Union, 2002) 
2009 was supposed to be the year in which the world’s most sophisticated global satel-
lite navigation system, named GALILEO in the astronomer’s honor, would be fully op-
erational. Four centuries after Galilei looked into the sky to understand our place in the 
universe, 30 state-of-the-art satellites should have been looking down on us, their po-
werful beams offering answers about where we are now and how to get where we want 
to go next.  
Instead, 2009 started – just as it will end – without a single one of the 30 satellites of the 
GALILEO constellation in orbit. At one point in 2007 the whole program seemed set to 
fail, following the collapse of the private consortium of aerospace and telecommunica-
tion companies that had been selected to build and operate the rival to America’s GPS 
system. 
Obviously, this highly complex prestigious technology project faces, seven years after 
the enthusiastic decision cited before, severe problems and is far from running 
smoothly. And, even when many problems that emerge today were foreseeable in 2002, 
the European Council made the decision to launch the project. 
The questions this thesis will deal with are that of a political agenda setting and decision 
process: Why has GALILEO finally been launched, although many obstacles hindered a 
5 
 
positive decision on the project for many years? What was the “critical mass” to get the 
go-ahead for the process? What where the circumstances that allowed for the launch? 
Why March 2002 as the time point of decision on Galileo? While it is true, that the 
project has been discussed over many years in advance of the final decision in March 
2002, it has never been entirely clear, that the project would go beyond the status of 
feasibility studies and definition works. Clearly, the political interest in the case was 
latent – pushed by mighty lobby groups. At the same time, the overall constellation was 
not in favor of the project in particular the fiscal stance in many important EU member 
states was tight in the late 1990s and early 2000s. And, in order to focus the scope of 
this paper, the council decision of March 2002 was chosen as the key point of reference 
for this paper. The developments since then, will be only shortly been outlined in parts 
of chapter 2. 
In detail, this paper will be organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 will present Europe’s satellite navigation system to the reader and will ela-
borate on the situation in the run-up of the Barcelona European Council of March 2002, 
i.e. the geopolitical situation. Also, the key economic, fiscal and financial engineering 
aspects will be touched. 
Chapter 3 will present theories of agenda setting and decision making, that will help 
later (in chapter 4) to analyze and understand the specific political process of decision 
making in the case of GALILEO. Theories of agenda setting will help to reflect the 
critical time of pre-2002 in the light of a high politics and low politics route and in view 
of issue specification, issue expansion and issue entrance. These categories will provide 
a systematic framework to understand GALILEO’s way on the EU agenda. The deci-
sion making theories will provide the necessary theoretical background to analyze the 
process of decision making from the actors perspective, i.e. in view of rationality of the 
decision, its incremental aspects and that of a garbage can situation and policy window 
in March 2002. 
Chapter 4 will apply the theories to the case of GALILEO, chapter 4.1 will deal with 
the agenda setting issue, while chapter 4.2 will analyze aspects of a more micro-based 
decision making of actors and will deal with the application of garbage can and window 
of opportunity to the case of GALILEO.  
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Chapter 5 will try to assess if presented theories fit the case of GALILEO and provide 
suitable sources of interpretation of this specific complex case of policy making. Also, it 
will be interesting to see, if, given the specific case of GALILEO, it seems possible to 
transfer some of the findings to other cases of European policy making.  
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2. GALILEO - Europe's Satellite Navigation System 
 
The following chapter will draw a rough picture of the specific aspects of GALILEO 
and what the circumstances of decision making were in 2002. In the four subchapters, 
aspects dealt with, are: What is GALILEO, what are its purposes and what where stages 
of project development and what is the state of play (2.1); a description of the geostra-
tegic background underlying the decision in favor of GALILEO in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (2.2); economic projections attributed to the launch of the project, not only 
in the industries primarily concerned in delivering the necessary satellite and ground 
module hard and software, but to the creation of a lead market in application tools (2.3); 
finally, questions of financial engineering, presenting a key in understanding the agenda 
setting and decision process of the GALILEO project (2.4).  
 
2.1 Purpose and State of Play 
The GNSS (GALILEO) satellite navigation project is part of the critical infrastructure 
policy of the EU and refers to active and intended market adjustment intervention to 
ensure that large-scale, technology-intensive infrastructures of vital interest are devel-
oped and maintained. As such, the GALILEO system is able to:  
• strengthen European transport infrastructures (aviation, land transport, and mari-
time) and the functioning of other structures 
• create positive macro-economic effects, user benefits, industrial competitiveness 
and employment 
• increase Europe's strategic control and ownership, strengthening its position in 
the world (Lechner; Baumann, 2000). 
At the end of the deployment phase, currently planned at 2011, the system will com-
prise a fleet of 30 medium-Earth-orbit satellites. Also, Europe wants to begin operation 
of GALILEO before the US next-generation Global Positioning System (GPS) III is 
launched, as it is scheduled to be in 2011 (Conti, 2009). 
There will be three main navigation services available: 
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• The Open Service (OS) will be free for anyone to access. Receivers will achieve 
an accuracy of less than 4 m horizontally and less than 8 m vertically if they use 
both OS bands.  
• The encrypted Commercial Service (CS) will be available for a fee and will of-
fer an accuracy of better than 1 m.  
• The encrypted Public Regulated Service (PRS) and Safety of Life Service 
(SoL) will both provide an accuracy comparable to the Open Service. Their 
main aim is robustness against jamming and the reliable detection of problems 
within 10 seconds. They will be targeted at security authorities (police, military, 
etc.) and safety-critical transport applications (air-traffic control, automated air-
craft landing, etc.), respectively (Mowthorpe, M., 2005). 
Phases of the Project: Originally, the GALILEO project has been developed jointly 
with the European Space Agency and EU as a civilian and commercially oriented radio 
navigation system under private-sector operational control. The definition and devel-
opment phases ran from 2000 to 2009 and were financed through bilateral national 
contributions to an ESA program and EU budget means. 
Today, the deployment phase is organized as a fully EU-run and financed operation, 
where the EU budget provides 3.4 billion EUR within the current financial perspective 
until 2014. The first tenders for the project are due to be terminated mid 2009 and are 
also organized by the EU Commission.  
The operator model for the exploitation phase, due to begin in 2012/2014 and to cover 
the whole 30 year life cycle of the system is not agreed upon yet. 
 
2.2 Geostrategic Assets 
Designed in the 1970s by the US Department of Defense, the Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS) was in the late 1990s and early 2000s - and is still so today - the only fully 
functional global positioning system. While its original purpose was strictly military, a 
less accurate level of GPS has been freely available for worldwide civilian use since the 
constellation reached full operational capability in 1995. The United States, through its 
provision of the GPS is able to promote its national interest by maintaining the system 
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as an international public good. The benefits of providing such a system include inter-
national prestige, technological leadership, economic competitiveness and security 
(Larsen, 2001). 
In contrast to GPS, GALILEO has been conceived as a civilian system (Mowthorpe, 
2005). One of the main arguments in its favor is that it will give Europeans independent 
and guaranteed access to a service currently provided by a foreign power. The risk that 
– especially in times of war – the US might decide to jam certain GPS signals and there-
fore compromise the integrity of civil applications is thought to be low. At the heights 
of the 1999/2000 Kosovo conflict, US president Bill Clinton ordered that this capability 
of the system be turned off. With no own positioning information available, European 
military participating in the operations were at that point relying on information pro-
vided by the American forces.  
Yet, even if Europeans could be certain that America’s GPS signals would never be 
interfered with, having two suppliers of satellite navigation data would be tremendously 
valuable from an operational point of view. No matter how benign the US Department 
of Defense is, in systems of the grade of complexity of a satellite navigation system, a 
backup system is always advised in questions of life-and-death. Parallels with the situa-
tion before the launch of the Airbus program are evident (Lungu, 2004) 
The GALILEO program represented an attempt by Europe to promote critical infra-
structure in an arena where Europe has no natural comparative advantage, but where 
international competition is being advanced through governmental intervention (Glea-
son, 2006). The promotion of the European navigation and positioning system, along 
with its associated infrastructure, can be seen as an attempt by Europe to become an 
effective strategic partner, or, as a memo of the US Pentagon suggests, that Europe 
would begin to challenge US dominance in a strategically important technology.1 
 
2.3 Economic Perspectives 
Since Europe, unlike the United States' GPS System, guarantees part of the signal, GA-
LILEO may be used for air traffic control, financial transactions and other applications 
                                                           
1
 Letter of Paul Wolfowitz, Vice Secretary of Defense, to the EU Ministers of Defense of December 1, 
2001 
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involving legal liability. GALILEO should have a communication payload to transfer 
navigation information. This would enable income to be generated from airliner, truck, 
taxi and bus fleets.  
But besides immediate economic effects through the construction of the system and 
generated income from its users, the main driver for the installation of a second satellite 
navigation system with superior services is to create a lead market in a technology field 
that is deemed to be of utmost strategic importance for the European technology indus-
try, i.e. application hard and software linked to the GALILEO system. 
The cumulative economic and social benefits of GALILEO to Europe were estimated at 
the end of the 1990s up to 2020 conservatively at 24 billion Euros, with a total invest-
ment cost of 6 billion Euros. France, Germany, Italy, and the UK each have a 17.3% 
share in the program, with Spain's share 10.13% and Belgium's 4.79%. EU estimates 
showed that GALILEO would create 100,000 jobs.2 
A 2001 PricewaterhouseCoopers study3, estimated the economic perspectives of GALI-
LEO as follows:  
• GALILEO is economically justified: the cost-benefit analysis shows a 
strong case for public sector commitment to the project. The business plan 
developed in this study shows a very positive cost-benefit ratio. It is sub-
stantially higher (almost double) than for comparable large publicly funded 
transport infrastructure projects (e.g. motorways, airports or highspeed rail-
ways). The study estimates the total benefits at € 17.8 bn (nominal price 
value) at a total cost, including operation of the system, of only € 3.9 bn 
(which implies a cost-benefit ratio of 4.6). This ratio should ultimately be 
even higher as for this study, only the benefits for the transport sectors were 
taken into account.  
• The study underlines the huge potential benefits of GALILEO in terms of 
applications for a wide range of sectors starting from all transport modes, to 
                                                           
2
 UK DTLR, Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions, Consultation on a European 
Commission’s Communication on GALILEO – Involving Euopre in a New Generation of Satellite 
Navigation Services, 1999 
3
 PriceWaterhouseCoopers: Inception study to support the development of a business plan for the 
GALILEO program TREN /B5/23-2001 
11 
 
personal communication and location, police, fire and civil protection oper-
ations, energy exploration and transport, insurance, agriculture and fisheries. 
Although more difficult to quantify, the study also shows that social benefits 
are significant, notably for the protection of the environment, employment 
and European technological development.  
• The study identified two major sources of market revenue: royalties from 
chipset sales and revenues from service providers. Projections showed that 
GALILEO would achieve positive operating cash flow already as from 2011 
onwards (only three years after beginning operation).  
 
2.4 Financial Engineering in Early 2002 
The stages for the carrying out of the program and the respective financing were defined 
at the end of 2001 as follows: 
• a definition phase, nearing completion 80 million EUR, already financed by 
ESA contributions and funding from the EU budget; supposed to run until 
2001 
• a development phase, that was at that time set to last from 2001-2005 with 
public financing of 1.1 billion EUR to 1.3 billion EUR, already programmed 
within the budgets of the European Union and the European Space Agency. 
The larger part of it (60 percent) were financed by the ESA, that is through 
bilateral financial contributions of ESA members. 
• A phase of deployment of the satellites (2006-2007), with financing 2.1 bil-
lion EUR,  
• An exploitation phase as from 2008, with maintenance expenses of about 
220 million EUR a year (Commission of the European Union, 2001).  
However, against the backdrop of an increasingly difficult fiscal situation in most of the 
EU countries in the early 2000s, in particular in France and Germany, neither a direct 
budgetary support for the deployment phase through an additional ESA program was 
possible, nor did the net contributors to the EU budget agree upon additional public 
funding for the deployment phase. The rather vague promises of additional growth ef-
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fects through the expected development of a lead market in Europe alone did not suffice 
to overcome immediate budgetary constraints. 
At this stage of the discussion, a new PwC4 study confirmed in end 2001 previous 
estimations on the costs of GALILEO: 3.6 billion EUR to complete the infrastructure of 
the system, on the assumption of a « worst case scenario » that includes significant 
contingencies and spare satellites.  
Also, as a key finding, the study elaborated on the feasibility of a Public Private Part-
nership for deployment and exploitation phases of the project: These two phases were 
supposed to be funded essentially by the private sector. The private sector would be 
compensated with the revenues coming from the operation of the system after its full 
launch, i.e. through user fees for high quality services, and on a quasi-tax on terminals 
sold. Revenues generated should allow paying for an interest on the equity invested by 
the public sector, to service debts issued by the private sector to gather additional capital 
and to pay for the maintenance costs of the system. 5 
 
                                                           
4
 PriceWaterhouseCoopers: Inception study to support the development of a business plan for the 
GALILEO program TREN /B5/23-2001 
5
 Additional means were foreseen in the EU budget, but only to guarantee a timely launch of the 
deployment phase, not as a substantive and lasting contribution to the program. 
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3. Agenda Setting and Decision Making from a 
Theoretical Perspective  
While the political, economic and financial settings in the run-up of the final decision 
were discussed in the previous chapter, the paper now turns to questions of theoretical 
frameworks that allow for a systematic analysis of the situation and the process of 
agenda setting and decision making in the case of GALILEO. Part 3.1 of this chapter 
will provide an overview of the theory of agenda setting, in particular in view of the 
European Union. A distinction between a high politics and a low politics route will be 
introduced. In sequence, the stages of issue specification, issue expansion and issue 
entrance will be presented. Agenda setting has been chosen as starting point of the theo-
retical part of this paper as discussions and power play in the run-up of the final deci-
sion on GALILEO in March 2002 can be well explained with this agenda setting 
framework. Part 3.2 will present decision making theories that will allow an assessment 
of the characteristics of the specific decision making process of GALILEO, in particular 
motivations for actors to decide. Also, this chapter will present theories that allow for 
some insight as concerns the advancement of the project in the political process, i.e. 
incrementalism, garbage can and policy window approach.  
 
3.1 Agenda Setting 
The literature (Cobb, Elder, 1972) understands ‘agenda’ as the list of issues that receive 
serious attention in a polity. Depending on who is giving this attention, several types of 
agenda may be discerned, such as the political agenda (the list of issues that receive 
serious attention from decision-makers), and the public agenda (the list of issues that 
receive serious attention from ‘the general public’) (Kingdon, 1995). 
In the context of the EU, the distinction between public and political agendas is less 
likely to be relevant, as public involvement in EU decision-making is very limited. Po-
litical protest plays a much smaller role at the EU than at the member state level (Imig, 
Tarrow, 2001). Moreover, the existence of an EU ‘public sphere’, a pre-condition for 
having an EU public agenda, is questionable to begin with (Princen, Rhinhard, 2006). A 
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focus on political–public agenda dynamics is therefore less relevant in an EU context 
than it might be in other polities. 
 
3.1.1 High Politics and Low Politics 
As shown, the difference between publically set agenda and politically set agenda and is 
of lesser interest in the case of the EU. However, a similar distinction may be made 
between types of agenda processes in the EU, creating a double logic between ‘high 
politics’ and ‘low politics’ in the EU (Caporaso, Keeler, 1995); (Peterson, Bomberg, 
1999). 
Ideal-typically, issues can come on to the agenda in one of two ways and the logics be-
hind are quite different: 
• either they are placed on the agenda ‘from above’ by the political leaders in the 
European Council (the ‘high politics’ route). This means, that the high politics 
route is primarily a political one. In the high politics route, issue initiation is dri-
ven by high-ranking political figures assembled in the European Council. The 
reason for placing an issue on the agenda is the occurrence of a shared political 
problem, often highlighted by a symbolic event. 
• or they are placed on the agenda ‘from below’ by experts working together in 
Commission Expert Groups or Council Working Parties (the ‘low politics’ 
route), with other words, the low politics route is primarily a technocratic one. 
Hence, issues will arise as a result of professional concerns among people 
working in the same issue area, which operate as an ‘epistemic community’ in 
the sense described by Haas.(Haas, 1989). Convergence around a given ap-
proach may occur gradually, as different points of view grow closer to one other 
(Princen, Rhinard, 2006). 
To give a deeper insight on how the two routes evolve, Rochefort, Cobb (1994) devel-
oped four stages of ‘issue careers’: issue initiation, issue specification, issue expansion 
and issue entrance. The issue initiation stage defines if a subject is dealt with in the “the 
high politics route” or the “low politics route”. The following stages will develop as the 
following elaborations and Figure 1 show.  
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3.1.2 Issue Specification 
Issue specification has to do with the further elaboration of a general issue into a set of 
specific demands (i.e. proposals). This is closely related to the process of framing, 
which is central to much of the agenda-setting literature (Rochefort, Cobb, 1994) The 
way an issue is framed is intimately linked with the specific venue in which it is dis-
cussed (Baumgartner, Jones, 1993). In the high politics route, the European Council will 
normally limit itself to defining the broad outlines of a common approach, leaving the 
details for lower level institutions to work out. In the low politics route, on the other 
hand, expert groups and working parties will seek to formulate specific, technically 
sound proposals on a given issue before sending them out into the broader decision-
making system. Issue specification in the low politics route is likely to reflect the sec-
toral biases and technical frames of the groups and working parties from which they 
emerge (Princen, Rhinhard, 2006). In the case of the European Union’s institutional 
framework, this could mean discussions that differ in its objectives and outcomes in the 
Budgetary Working Group in contrast to working groups of other sectors and Council 
formations. 
 
3.1.3 Issue Expansion 
Issue expansion describes the way issues are moved beyond the initial actors in specific 
venues to a wider set of participants. In the high politics route, issue expansion typically 
takes place from the European Council to lower level institutions that have the power to 
adopt formal decisions, such as the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. 
In the low politics route, issue expansion takes place towards the higher level institu-
tions that eventually have to decide on proposals (Princen, Rhinard, 2006). 
 
3.1.4 Issue Entrance 
As issue entrance the literature (Princen, Rhinard, 2006) describes when an issue gains 
access to the formal agenda of EU decision-makers. In both routes, this is normally not 
the same venue as where the issue was initiated. The two processes present distinct 
opportunities and risks in terms of agenda entrance. The main opportunity inherent in 
the high politics route is that it may overcome political and institutional inertia by 
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creating a large amount of political impetus for change. The main risk, however, lies in 
the watering down or return to inertia that may occur when attention shifts to new issues 
and the political impetus fades. The main opportunity of the low politics route lies in the 
creation of a self-sustaining dynamic and reaching a ‘point of no return’ by gradually 
expanding EU activity on a given issue. Yet the main risk of this route is that issues 
may be blocked or ‘hijacked’ once they move outside the confines of low politics insti-
tutions and the circle of participants is widened. 
 
 
Stage in issue career High politics route Low politics route 
Initiation By political leaders due to politically 
salient event 
Out of professional concerns in 
epistemic communities 
Specification Formulation of political consensus 
on an EU response in the European 
Council 
Formulation of specific and tech-
nical policy proposals in Expert 
Groups and Working Parties 
Expansion  Towards lower levels of decision-
making in the EU 
Towards higher levels of decision-
making in the EU 
Entrance  By creating political momentum By gradually building impetus 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the two agenda setting routes6 
 
In reality, the two rotes will most likely not occur in their ‘pure’ forms, however, the 
two routes may be linked in a number of ways, as Princen and Rhinard (2006) rightly 
point out:  
• agenda-setting processes around certain issues can occur somewhere in between; 
for instance, with issues being initiated at the intermediate level of decision-
making by permanent representatives.  
• issues may change character over time and thus lead to changing agenda dynam-
ics. An issue may originate as a low politics issue, but suddenly gain political 
momentum due to a focusing event or convergence of thinking at the high poli-
                                                           
6
 Princen, S. and Rhinard, M.: Crashing and Creeping: agenda setting dynamics in the European Union, 
Journal of European Public Policy 13:7, September 2006, 1119-1132 
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tics level. The reverse is also possible: an issue may begin as a high politics is-
sue but then recede into obscurity, only to be taken up again by lower level offi-
cials.  
•  the two processes might be unfolding simultaneously (or nearly so), each having 
a reciprocal effect on the other. Issue initiation may occur primarily through the 
high politics route, for instance, while issue specification is influenced more by 
low politics agenda dynamics. 
 
3.1.5 Empirical Expectations 
This theoretical framework gives rise to some empirical expectations. Institutional 
structures will play an important mediating role as an issue’s agenda career unfolds. 
This will also most likely be the case with GALILEO. In the stages of initiation and 
specification, institutional constraints will largely determine which frames are feasible 
and effective. Legal limitations to the EU’s competences, for instance, will constrain 
issue initiation and shape how an issue can be specified, in particular if the project has 
been originally launched as a inter-governmental project in the ESA-framework, not as 
a EU project. Moreover, the multiplicity of EU venues means that several different 
‘issue specifications’ may emerge from low-level processes. In the expansion stage, the 
complexity of EU institutional structures will offer opportunities for actors to steer pro-
posals into certain venues, and to call upon sympathetic expert communities to build 
support. Many rounds of Council working groups and respective opportunities for the 
Commission to intervene in the process, will most likely in a complex case as GALI-
LEO play an important role in this regard. The arrival of new actors and new venues can 
present problems to those who desire the placement of an issue on the EU agenda in a 
particular form. This, in turn, may affect the prospects for entrance of an issue on to the 
EU’s political agenda. 
 
3.2 Decision Making 
Decision making can be regarded as an outcome of cognitive processes leading to the 
selection of a course of action among several alternatives. Every decision making 
process produces a final choice (Reason, 1990). The output can be an action or an opi-
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nion of choice. Human performance in decision making terms has been the subject of 
research from several perspectives. From a psychological perspective, it is necessary to 
examine individual decisions in the context of a set of needs, preferences an individual 
has and values they seek. From a cognitive perspective, the decision making process 
must be regarded as a continuous process integrated in the interaction with the environ-
ment. From a normative perspective, the analysis of individual decisions is concerned 
with the logic of decision making and rationality and the invariant choice it leads to 
(Kahnemann, Tversky, 2000).  
In decision making also a line has to be drawn between individual decision making and 
collective decision making. While individual decision making comprises only one indi-
vidual being forced in a situation of decision to sort out its preferences and then apply 
its decision to a reality setting, collective decisions are more complex and the interests 
of different actors (be them their self individuals, or collective actors in the form of cor-
porate actors, coalitions, movements, clubs or associations) must be aligned in a more 
or less systematic way to reach a decision (Hardin, 1982; Olsen, 1965). Newer publica-
tions (Thaler, Sandstein, 2008) point to the limited horizons of individuals and that in-
dividuals are restricted in their own world of choices.  
 
3.2.1 Rational Decisions and Bounded Rationality  
Some models of human behavior in the social sciences assume that humans can be 
reasonably approximated or described as "rational" entities (see for example rational 
choice theory). Many economic models assume that people are on average rational, and 
can in large enough quantities be approximated to act according to their preferences. 
The basic idea of rational choice theory is that patterns of behavior in societies reflect 
the choices made by individuals as they try to maximize their benefits and minimize 
their costs. In other words, people make decisions about how they should act by com-
paring the costs and benefits of different courses of action. As a result, patterns of beha-
vior will develop within the society that result from those choices. 
The main problem with rational-comprehensive approaches is that it is often very costly 
in terms of time and other resources that must be devoted to gathering the relevant 
information. Often the costs and benefits of the various options are very uncertain and 
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difficult to quantify for rigorous comparison. The costs of undertaking rational-compre-
hensive decision-making may themselves exceed the benefits to be gained in improved 
quality of decisions (Johnsen, 1994). 
The concept of bounded rationality revises this assumption to account for the fact that 
perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible in practice due to the finite computa-
tional resources available for making them. 
The term is thought to have been coined by Herbert Simon. In Models of Man, Simon 
(1957) points out that most people are only partly rational, and are in fact emo-
tional/irrational in the remaining part of their actions. In another work, he states "boun-
dedly rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems 
and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information". Simon de-
scribes a number of dimensions along which "classical" models of rationality can be 
made somewhat more realistic, while sticking within the vein of fairly rigorous formali-
zation. These include: 
• Limiting what sorts of utility functions there might be.  
• Recognizing the costs of gathering and processing information.  
• The possibility of having a "vector" or "multi-valued" utility function.  
Simon suggests that economic agents employ the use of heuristics to make decisions 
rather than a strict rigid rule of optimization. They do this because of the complexity of 
the situation, and their inability to process and compute the expected utility of every 
alternative action. Deliberation costs might be high and there are often other economic 
activities where similar decision making is required. 
Kahneman (2003) proposes bounded rationality as a model to overcome some of the 
limitations of the rational-agent models in economic literature.  
Gigerenzer and Selten (2002) argue that most decision theorists who have discussed 
bounded rationality have not really followed Simon's ideas about it. Rather, they have 
either considered how people's decisions might be made sub-optimal by the limitations 
of human rationality, or have constructed elaborate optimizing models of how people 
might cope with their inability to optimize. Gigerenzer instead proposes to examine 
simple alternatives to a full rationality analysis as a mechanism for decision making, 
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and he and his colleagues have shown that such simple heuristics frequently lead to bet-
ter decisions than the theoretically optimal procedure. 
 
3.2.2 Incrementalism  
Because an exhaustive analysis of the costs and benefits of every conceivable option for 
dealing with a problem in public policy is often unduly time-consuming and expensive, 
large organizations (and often individuals) may resort to a practical shortcut in deciding 
on possible improvements of existing programs. Only a few of the many possible op-
tions are seriously examined, and these tend to be ones that involve only small changes 
in existing policies or procedures rather than radical innovations. Changes are thus 
made only "at the margin."(Johnsen 1994) 
Lindblom (1959), the original author of the theory of incremental decision making es-
sentially says that a rational technical approach is not possible, and he offers an alterna-
tive — or at least an explanation of why the despised political maneuvering of adminis-
trative decision making may not be as bad as it appears.  
Lindblom's perspective is seen in two other areas related to public administration: Wi-
davsky’s “Incrementalism, and Defense Budgeting: A Bibliographic Essay “ applies the 
incrementalism theory to military budget issues” (Wildavsky, 1994) and political struc-
ture, while Dahl (2003) to the theory of pluralism. In economics it is related to Nobel 
Prize-winner Herbert Simon's (1957) work on limited rationality. The core elements of 
the Lindblom’s theory are: 
• Ends and means are intimately intertwined, i.e., we often know our ends only 
from consideration of the means we are contemplating.  
• Only a few means are considered ... [Assumes that managers have limited time 
and other resources (including information) to decide, so they can only do non-
comprehensive analysis.]  
• ... and only those which don't represent too much of a departure from the status 
quo. (Thus the name, "branch method", where each policy branches off to 
another.)  
21 
 
• Evaluation of the means is crude, in that many consequences are ignored. (This 
ignoring of consequences often occurs because a full analysis is not possible.)  
• Choice among the means is determined by agreement among interested parties 
rather than by summary indicators arising from the analysis.  
• Agreement is the only empirical indicator of virtue, because values are not 
usually clear-cut or even shared.  
 
3.2.3 Garbage Can Model  
The garbage can model was developed Cohen, March and. Olsen (1972) in reference to 
"ambiguous behaviors", i.e. explanations/interpretations of behaviors which at least 
appear to contradict classical theory. The garbage can model was greatly influenced by 
the realization that extreme cases of aggregate uncertainty in decision environments 
would trigger behavioral responses which, at least from a distance, appear "irrational" or 
at least not in compliance with the total/global rationality of "economic man" (e.g. "act 
first, think later"). The garbage can model was originally formulated in the context of 
the operation of universities and their many inter-departmental communications prob-
lems. 
The garbage can model tried to expand organizational decision theory into the then un-
charted field of organizational anarchy which is characterized by "problematic prefe-
rences", "unclear technology" and "fluid participation". The theoretical breakthrough of 
the garbage can model is that it disconnects problems, solutions and decision makers 
from each other, unlike traditional decision theory. Specific decisions do not follow an 
orderly process from problem to solution, but are outcomes of several relatively inde-
pendent stream of events within the organization."(Cohen, March, Olsen, 1972). Four of 
those streams were identified in Cohen, March and Olsen's original conceptualization:  
• Problems require attention, they are the result of performance gaps or the inabil-
ity to predict the future. Thus, problems may originate inside or outside the or-
ganization Traditionally, it has been assumed that problems trigger decision 
processes; if they are sufficiently grave, this may happen. Usually, however, or-
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ganization man goes through the "garbage" and looks for a suitable fix.... called 
a "solution".  
• Solutions have a life on their own. They are distinct from problems which they 
might be called on to solve. Solutions are answers (more or less actively) look-
ing for a question. Participants may have ideas for solutions; they may be at-
tracted to specific solutions and volunteer to play the advocate. Only trivial so-
lutions do not require advocacy and preparations. Significant solutions have to 
be prepared without knowledge of the problems they might have to solve.  
• Choice opportunities are occasions when organizations are expected (or think 
they are expected) to produce behavior that can be called a decision (or an "initi-
ative"). Just like politicians cherish "photo opportunities", organization man 
needs occasional "decision opportunities" for reasons unrelated to the decision 
itself.  
• Participants come and go; participation varies between problems and solutions. 
Participation may vary depending on the other time demands of participants (in-
dependent from the particular "decision" situation under study). Participants may 
have favorite problems or favorite solutions which they carry around with them. 
Why "garbage can"? It was suggested that organizations tend to produce many "solu-
tions" which are discarded due to a lack of appropriate problems. However problems 
may eventually arise for which a search of the garbage might yield fitting solutions 
(Kilduff, Angelmar, 2000) 
Probably the most extreme view (namely that of organizational anarchy) is that of the 
Carnegie School. Organizations operate on the basis of inconsistent and ill-defined pre-
ferences; their own processes are not understood by their members; they operate by trial 
and error; their boundaries are uncertain and changing; decision-makers for any partic-
ular choice change capriciously. To understand organizational processes, one can view 
choice opportunities as garbage cans into which various kinds of problems and solutions 
are dumped. The mix of garbage depends on the mix of labeled cans available, on what 
garbage is currently produced and the speed with which garbage and garbage cans are 
removed (March, Olsen, 1979). 
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3.2.4 Policy Window Approach 
Kingdon (1995) describes the process of opening a policy window as involving three 
convergent streams: the problem stream involving problem identification and recogni-
tion often based upon indicators or focusing events; the policy stream populated by 
disparate policy communities producing alternatives and proposals; and the political 
stream incorporating shifts in public opinion, administration changes, and interest 
groups. These streams, all flowing independently with a life of their own and driven by 
differing forces, are coupled by policy entrepreneurs at critical points in time in an 
effort to influence agenda setting and advocate policy alternatives. A policy window 
then opens “because of change in the political stream or… because a new problem cap-
tures the attention of governmental officials and those close to them,” thereby providing 
the opportunity for action in the form of policy proposals and alternatives (Kingdon, 
1995)  
In essence, a policy window opens in either the political stream, or the problem stream 
leading to coupling efforts on the part of entrepreneurs and a place on the decision 
agenda. If, however, coupling does not occur when the problem or political streams set 
the governmental agenda, there is little chance an item will rise on the actual decision 
agenda on which action is to be taken, as the streams by themselves are not capable of 
setting decision agenda items. Thus, when a problem is identified and the political envi-
ronment favorable, it is vital that the policy stream produces viable alternatives. Other-
wise, the risk of an item fading from the decision agenda is vastly increased. 
 
3.2.5 Empirical Expectations 
Like the theoretical framework of agenda setting, the framework of decision making 
creates some empirical expectations. While complex institutional structures may blur 
many single decisions, they nevertheless provide for some ground for rational choices: 
the length of the processes, the number of persons involved and the many checks and 
balances in the course of an issue through the EU procedures lay ground for a solid base 
of information and hence, a rational decision. At the same time, many particular inter-
ests have an impact on the single decision and the outcome may appear much less ra-
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tional than the years of information gathering and computational sort-out of variations 
would suggest.  
Incrementalism is certainly a theory with some empirical evidence, however, transferred 
to a “big-bang” one-time decision like a go or no-go for a large-scale, highly politicized 
project, may not add much insight. Incrementalism would be more easily to detect in a 
sequence of EU Council working groups where projects are dealt with on an expert 
level.  
Garbage Can and Policy Window seem to have a high degree of practical evidence. 
Many projects are in the air without making it either to the agenda – they are kept down 
by parties with the respective interest in low-level policy streams – or do not reach suf-
ficient high level support until some significant background variables changes and the 
projects can take off.  
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4. Agenda Setting and Decision Making: The Case of 
GALILEO 
 
In this chapter the frameworks and theories presented in chapter 3 of this paper will be 
applied to the concrete case of GALILEO. The chapter begins with the application of 
the agenda setting theories and then turns to the application of the theories of decision 
making. With regard to agenda setting, the paper will discuss GALILEO’s routes 
through high and low politics, issue specification, issue expansion and issue entrance. 
Concerning decision making, theories of rational and bounded rationality, incremental-
ism, garbage can and Kingdon’s policy window approach will be applied to the case of 
GALILEO, so as to provide a deeper insight of the decisions made in March 2002. Both 
sub-chapters, 4.1 and 4.2, have the same period - that is the run-up of March 2002 and 
the following months - as reference, but offer a different theoretical perspective.  
 
4.1 The Agenda Setting of GALILEO 
Since the mid-1990s, the idea of setting up a European satellite navigation system draw 
increasingly attention (Munsberg, 1999). Being a highly technical issue, and, at the 
same time an issue that involves space and national prestige, discussions in both chan-
nels of attention, were gaining momentum, in the public sphere and in the political 
sphere. It is right to assume, that in the EU context the public sphere is underdeveloped 
and, hence, might not be the central playground for the discussion on GALILEO (Imig, 
Tarrow, 2001). Nevertheless, the public sphere contributed to the discussion, if not on a 
concrete level of development/deployment/exploitation, but in some member countries, 
in particular in France, the public opinion included anti-American resentments, foster-
ing the wish and the vision to set up a European counterweight to GPS.7 At the same 
time, a number of charismatic political leaders that were at that time at the pinnacle of 
their power, choose to put forward the satellite navigation issue in the highest political 
spheres, that is the European Council and in bilateral high level meetings.  
Also, representing an issue that comes with a high profile, multi-billion Euro tender 
volume, the European space industry was since many years actively pursuing the 
                                                           
7
 Le Monde, Article: Bruxelles a su resister aux pressions americaines, March, 27, 2002 
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project, gathering support from political decision makers in military and business ad-
ministrations.  
Hence, GALILEO made its way de facto on both agendae, the public and the political, 
which is rather unique, given the technical complexity of the subject.  
 
4.1.1 GALILEO in High Politics and Low Politics 
The idea that GALILEO’s main stream is to be found at the political route, fits to the 
definition developed by Caporaso and Keeler (1995). The actual issue initiation is a 
political one that is, the actual go-ahead for the project came in March 13-14, 2002, 
when the European Council decided unanimously to start the project and advised their 
Transport Ministers to enact the release of 450 million EUR in order to fund the starting 
of the development phase of GALILEO.  
In contrast, the route of low politics is not crucial for that one point in time, March 
2002, that the project has been launched. While in many working party sessions models 
of development and respective financing have been discussed, no clear agreement could 
be made on working party level. At best, technocratic and professional concerns among 
people working in the area of transport, satellite, and military went into the direction 
that it might be positive for Europe to have a satellite navigation system of her own. At 
the same time, opposition came from those professionals working on the financial side 
of the project, as in 2002 it was clear that a fully funded project- in particular not a fully 
funded deployment phase - would not be possible within the given financial frame-
work(Commission of the European Union, 2001). 
 
4.1.2 Issue Specification, Expansion and Entrance of GALILEO 
Following further Rochefort’s and Cobb’s (1994) issues career, issue specification, ex-
pansion and entrance, GALILEO’s case comprises comparatively little surprises. 
As to issue specification, the frame provided for the issue is the European Council, as a 
project of this size, its financial and budgetary implications but also its political bris-
ance, could only be dealt with at the highest political level. As Rochfort and Cobb 
(1994) suggest, the European council limited itself in the case of GALILEO to defining 
the board guidelines of a common approach, leaving the details for lower level institu-
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tions to work out. It is true, that also in the case of issue specification, a certain degree 
of preparatory work has been carried out in TREN-working groups, in the Budget 
Committee and, of course in the COREPER. At the same time, the lower levels of po-
litical decision were not able to overcome the specific problem of the lack of funds for 
the deployment phase. Any council formation, as ardent as promoter of the satellite na-
vigation system they might have been, knew that a failed and discontinued investment, 
would be politically not feasible. The differing degree of promoting the project within 
different levels and formations of working groups and COREPER, fits well in Roche-
fort’s dictum of sectoral biases: While the Budget Committee was fairly reluctant to go 
ahead with the deployment phase without having a hammered-down contract with the 
private sector consortium in order to have a clear and reliable funding scheme for the 
deployment phase, other sectoral formations were less hesitant to go ahead, in particular 
the TREN working parties.8 
 
In issue expansion, the dominant high policy route of GALILEO is once more stressed, 
as the following communication from the council indicates: “Following on from the 
unanimous conclusions of the Barcelona European Council on 13-14 March 2002, the 
Council of Transport Ministers today released the € 450m needed to develop GALI-
LEO, Europe's satellite navigation and positioning system, and at the same time adopted 
the regulation establishing the joint undertaking responsible for operating it.” This 
statement proves that the high policy route is quasi model-like followed as the European 
Council empowers the subordinate Transport and Energy Council to proceed with the 
program and to release 450 million EUR following the TREN Council session of March 
26, 2002.  
 
Finally, issue entrance: that is according to Caporaso and Keeler, when an issue gains 
access to the formal agenda of EU decision makers. Here, again, the dominance of the 
high politics route can be observed. With many TREN council sessions before March 
2002 and a number of occasions where the European Council discussed GALILEO9, the 
                                                           
8
 Euractiv.com:  Transport Council adopts GALILEO program, March 27, 2002 
9
 The European Council came closest to a positive decision on GALILEO in its Stockholm meeting in 
March 2001, when the lack of sustainable funding from the side of the industry put the project again on 
hold.  
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issue made a clear entrance on the high policy route. A certain backing from the techno-
cratic low-level route can also be detected as many working party and COREPER ses-
sions worked on feasibility studies etc.10 At the same time, the key question of a politi-
cal judgment of industry support for the project could have never been made by any 
other formation than the European Council itself, keeping in mind the enormous politi-
cal prestige of the project (and the risk of failure) and the considerable budgetary obli-
gations involved.11 
 
4.2 GALILEO: Decision Making 
At this juncture, it makes sense to reiterate, that decision making can be regarded as an 
outcome of cognitive processes leading to the selection of a course of action among 
several alternatives. Every decision making process produces a final choice (Reason, 
1990). The output can be an action or an opinion of choice. In the case of GALILEO, 
obviously the interest lies on a choice of action that is, to decide to launch the satellite 
navigation system in March 2002. As the decider is in this case the European Council, it 
is clear that we deal with an act of collective decision making.  
 
4.2.1 Rational Decisions and Bounded Rationality 
As outlined in chapter 3 of this paper, many economic models assume that people act 
rationally, and can in large enough quantities be approximated to act according to their 
preferences. In the multi-player, multi-layer environment of the European Union, this 
large enough quantity is present, as the sheer number of processes, decisions rounds and 
the number of smart players involved account for a high degree of statistical reliability 
with little variance.  
Simon (1957) argues in Models of Man that limits in formulating and solving complex 
problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information 
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 PriceWaterhouseCoopers: Inception study to support the development of a business plan for the 
GALILEO program TREN /B5/23-2001 
11
 In addition, a long-term liability that is necessary to launch, deploy and operate a project like 
GALILEO (i.e. a 30 years horizon) is, from the legal perspective, slippery ground in the EU budget law. 
The longest reaching financial outlook the EU has at its disposal is the seven year framework – 
considerably less than the life span of a satellite navigation system. Also, the EU budget is not allowed to 
draw on credit financing, limiting further the possibilities to fund long-term projects.  
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severely limit the base for a rational decision and leads to a bounded rationality. While 
this might be the case in more individually driven processes, EU decision making offers 
its players usually months of preparation with considerable man power and financial 
means involved to direct technical studies to raise the level of expertise. Also, many 
rounds in working groups, COREPER and Council sessions allow for a large setting to 
exchange views on any aspect of a subject.  
Seen from outside, it seems more, that the main problem is to understand all rationales 
behind decisions and voting patterns on all levels of EU decision making of all players 
in a complex case like GALILEO, then that players act according to a bounded ratio-
nality.  
• Actions of representatives in working groups in Brussels might not be consistent 
with their own opinion but might be a watered-down compromise found within 
their own government’s coordination processes. Ministries of Finance naturally 
put a greater emphasis on the financial engineering of such a large scale, long 
running project, like GALILEO, in particular when budgetary law restricts legal 
possibilities of long term financing and sustainable funding options are elusive. 
Line Ministeries, like TREN Ministers would care more for the technical feasi-
bility and economic second-round effects of satellite navigation. The position a 
member state finally presents in Brussels, in particular in the European Council, 
will have to strike a balance between these different positions within one gov-
ernment.  
• Or, a position presented in Brussels in the case of GALILEO might not be that 
of the member state’s governance at all, it might have been the outcome of a 
compromise with another government in exchange for support for another issue 
in a completely different context. 
Without sufficient information on all rationales of all the players, on all levels, it will 
not be possible to fully draw a map of rational decision, but, given the facts mentioned 
before, it seems realistic that rational decision making is highly relevant in EU 
processes: 
• The geostrategic and military playing field seems to offer little explanation for 
an alternation of a rational decision in March 2002 to opt in favor of GALILEO, 
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as parameters were clear after the Kosovo crisis and the “turn-off of GPS 
through the US executive.  
• However, after a change of some parameters of the overall estimation of the eco-
nomic outlook for GALILEO, in particular the expected financial contribution of 
the private sector to the system, and the feasibility of a PPP, the setting for the 
decision were altered in the “last second” before the meeting in a way that pres-
sure to vote pro GALILEO became too great to resist for decision makers, even 
if their former rational analysis of the situation told them to vote against.12 On 
the basis of the new study, a rational decision was made possible.  
 
4.2.2 Incremental Aspects of GALILEO 
In contrast to decisions made by rational reflections, the incremental approach seems to 
offer little insight for a high profile decision in one single European Council session, 
like the decision on GALILEO. 
Incremental practices are more likely to be found in decision preparatory working 
groups and line-ministry Councils like the TREN council. Therefore, it is true, that in-
cremental practices also play a role in high profile cases, such as GALILEO. A unique 
single point decision whether or not to launch a large scale project is, however, not to be 
characterized as an incremental decision. The role of incrementalism might be seen in 
parallel to the high politics route and the low politics route, discussed earlier in the 
agenda setting section of this paper: A pure form of a rational one-point-in-time-deci-
sion is as little likely to be found, as a pure high politics route case of agenda setting. 
Nevertheless, the incremental route can be called, at best, a preparatory route, forming, 
with its gathering and weighting of information and proposing little variances to a sub-
ject, the ground for a rational decision. Lindblom’s case criteria for incremental changes 
do not fit to the case of GALILEO, in particular, the idea that only those ideas can be 
chosen by deciders that do not deviate too much from the status quo (Lindblom, 1957). 
 
                                                           
12 PriceWaterhouseCoopers: Inception study to support the development of a business plan for the 
GALILEO program TREN /B5/23-2001 
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4.2.3 Garbage Can and Policy Window: The Window of Opportunity for GALI-
LEO 
The garbage can model fits fairly well to a case of high profile policy making, such as 
GALILEO. The four streams identified by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) are easily to 
extract from this specific case:  
• The problem stream is the result of a performance gap, in this case the lack of a 
European Satellite navigation system. The problem triggered the search for a 
suitable solution, and the EU came up with the project concept of GALILEO. 
• The solution stream would see the satellite navigation system as a challenging 
and interesting technical project that would be a nice-to-have. So, it is the solu-
tion that is having a life of its own and that is being advocated actively and for a 
long period of time by pressure groups, e.g. the European space industry, but 
also discussed in academic and military circles. This solution is looking for the 
fitting problem that can be solved.  
• The EU Council meeting in March 2002 can be seen as the choice opportunities 
stream: Political pressure on participants to come up with a solution, that is to 
give Europe an independent satellite navigation system, was high; and the pub-
lic, at least the well informed public, expected a decision to be made.  
• Finally, the participants stream is, in the case of GALILEO, that in March 2002, 
those Council members, that were highly in favor of the project were at the pin-
nacle of their power. In particular, freshly reelected President Chirac of France 
with the important French space sector behind him was a most ardent promoter 
of the project. The French side was particularly strong as its steadily reiterated 
argument that space intelligence would have to be independent from the US be-
came more credible after the US comportment in the Kosovo crisis.  
 
Ultimately, Kingdon’s policy window approach assumes that a policy window opens 
in either the political stream, or the problem stream leading to coupling efforts on the 
part of entrepreneurs and a place on the decision agenda (Kingdon, 1995). 
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In the case of GALILEO, this would suggest a shift in public opinion or a shift in the 
opinion of the administration due to a specific external event, which is comparatively 
easily to identify as the Kosovo crisis. However, a certain time-lag has to be attested: 
The event of the Kosovo crisis and the US imposed shut-down of GPS data for Euro-
pean military and intelligence happened in early 2000.  
Obviously, a counter weight stopped the window to open immediately after the trigger 
event. Here, the financial engineering played the major role. Against the backdrop of 
tight fiscal situations in major EU countries, Budget Committee and ECOFIN resisted 
for a long time the launch of GALILEO, as no sufficient funding was available for the 
deployment phase and no sustainable concept for the exploitation phase was found ei-
ther (Presidency of the European Council – ECOFIN, 2001). 
Only with the new numbers presented in the PwC study it became possible to alleviate 
reservations footing on financial reasons. Fiscal challenges were presented in a more 
manageable way with higher revenues and a more front loaded revenue profile. Costs 
were deemed comparatively stable and reinforced previous calculations. Also, with 
public funds scarcely available, the idea was brought up to provide private funds for the 
deployment and exploitation phases of the project.  
• On the revenue side, the PwC study came up with significant higher returns and 
with a more front-loaded revenue profile. Overall revenues were estimated at 
951 million EUR until 2020, while previous studies estimated revenues at 640 
million EUR or 625 m EUR. 
• On the costs, the PwC study came up with higher numbers than previous ESA 
and EC estimates. However, cost increases were comparatively smaller than the 
additional revenue estimated by the PwC study and were in part due to the fact 
that the PwC study came out as the last estimate, where cost overruns in the de-
velopment phase already materialized.  
• Also, the study advocated the feasibility of a PPP project, so that the public side 
would be liberated from the financing of the deployment phase, in exchange for 
the concession of the rights to generate revenues to be transferred to the private 
sector, once the system is operational.  
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Euro m 
(2001 
prices) 
PwC Geminus Study13 GALA Study14 
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
Service 
Revenues 
6 70 200 65 125 165 25 80 305 
Purchase 
Revenues 
60 300 315 10 60 215 30 75 109 
Total 66 370 515 75 185 380 55 155 415 
 
Table 2: Revenue Comparison PwC Study v. Previous Studies15 
 
 
Euro m in 2001 
prices 
Development Deployment Total 
PwC ESA  EC PwC ESA EC PwC ESA EC 
Ground segment 423 341 903 354 471 1,840 777 812 2,743 
Space segment 562 485  1,270 979  1,832 1,464  
ESA costs 99 83 98 55 48 62 154 131 160 
Contingencies 166 91 99 170 150 198 336 241 297 
Other 127   180 50  307 50  
TOTAL 1,377 999 1,100 2,029 1,698 2,100 3,406 2,697 3,200 
 
Table 3: Cost Comparison Development and Deployment Case Studies, PwC Study 
v. other Studies16 
 
                                                           
13
 Dutton, L., Brami, S., Pasquali, R., & Haro, P: The GEMINUS Galileo Service Definition in: 
Proceedings of the International Symposium GEOMARK 2000, Paris, France, 10-12 April 2000.  
14
 European Project GALA was the prior study of the global architecture of the Galileo system, realised 
by several companies and institutes in the European Community, for ESA (European Space Agency). 
15
 PriceWaterhouseCoopers: Inception study to support the development of a business plan for the 
GALILEO program TREN /B5/23-2001 
16
 As before. 
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In sum, the presentation of the PwC study in late 2001 strengthened the assumption that 
the GALILEO project would be financially viable. Together with the positive signals 
from the private sector to agree on a PPP for deployment and exploitation phase, and 
hence with the assumption that additional expenses for the public side could be avoided, 
the chorus of those doubting the viability of the project was significantly weakened. 
With the financial engineering reservations diminished and the political argument, that 
Europe could not allow herself to stay in the hand of foreign powers in view of satellite 
navigation, produced the necessary shift in the political stream to finally launch GALI-
LEO: the policy window opened. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper applied theories of agenda setting and decision making to a concrete case of 
European policy making: The launch of the European satellite navigation system GA-
LILEO.  
The key point of reference for agenda setting and decision making is the Barcelona Eu-
ropean Council of March 15 and 16, 2002. While discussed in many sessions before, in 
this specific session the Council decided to ask the Ministers of Transport to make the 
necessary follow-up decisions regarding both the funding and launching of this program 
and the setting up of the operational unit contracted with the organization of the project, 
the Joint Undertaking in cooperation with ESA. 
The theoretical framework for analysis of agenda setting and decision making helped to 
sort out a number of observations that could be extracted from the political process in 
the case of GALILEO:  
1. While it is not possible to purely attribute this case of political agenda setting to 
either Corporaso’s high or low policy route, the agenda setting of GALILEO is 
obviously more characterized by the high politics route. Rationale: high public 
visibility, prestigious technology involved, and the question if Europe is able to 
emancipate herself from US dominance. Also the other issue career stages, such 
as issue specification, expansion and entrance show the characteristics of a high 
policy route. 
2. With regard to decision making, the overall policy process in a complex negotia-
tion issue, as GALILEO with its many layers of national and then Brussels cir-
cles of decision making, allows for a rather rational approach to decision mak-
ing. Over the preparatory period of many years, many studies were conducted 
and expert rounds were hold, so the empirical base for decision making was 
fairly solid. In particular, this holds true, when acknowledged that the studies 
closer to the positive decision on GALILEO provide a more positive perspective 
concerning costs and expected revenues. At the same time, the decision on GA-
LILEO, seen from outside - and in particular in retrospective where many ob-
stacles emerged that were latently known at the time of the decision – might not 
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seem rationale. This is due to the fact that from outside not all relevant decision-
determining aspects on all layers between all players are known. The emergence 
of a new PwC study, readjusting expected revenues and burdens for the public 
budgets, allowed for a different, that is positive, rational decision, than in the pe-
riod before. Seen from a different perspective, the PwC study could also be seen 
as a justification for deciders to decide in favor of GALILEO, even if significant 
doubts about the feasibility of the project remained.  
3. The question, why GALILEO made it to the agenda and finally passed the 
Barcelona council session, leads to the application of the garbage can and policy 
window theories. Here, the political stream of Kingdon’s policy window ap-
proach came to a point where the retarding element of unsecure financing be-
came less important, as, in the pretext of the summit, a new PwC study came up 
with more optimistic estimates concerning the expected financial revenue of the 
program and the viability of a PPP for the deployment and exploitation phases. 
At the same time, the political situation, that is the assessment of main European 
policy makers and the informed public, that Europe would have to become more 
independent from US satellite navigation, did still provide for some strong ar-
guments in favor of GALILEO. While the political stream was too weak, when 
only the geopolitical argument was on the table, the pivotal change in the as-
sessment on the finance side allowed for the launch of the project in March 
2002. 
4. The possible broader implications of the findings of the case of GALILEO are 
extremely difficult to assess: The uniqueness of the project (highest European 
and international political stakes, financial dimension, budgetary implications, 
expected lead market and associated industry political interests) make for a 
fairly singular position of GALILEO in contrast to other, more usual technology 
policy projects. However, the findings on decision making, i.e. the rationality of 
the EU decision making process and the power of one single study (that comes 
against the backdrop of an overall favorable political assessment and high lobby 
group pressure) to turn around a discussion might also be transferable to lower-
profile cases.  
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